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Strategy and Counter-Surprise: 
 
Intelligence within BAOR and NATO's Northern Army Group 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The UK's main military role after 1945 was its commitment to NATO. The most visible 
contribution was the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), a force of over 50,000 personnel, 
supported by RAF Germany, committed to the defence of Northern Germany. In wartime, the 
Commander of BAOR would have donned his NATO hat and also become Commander of 
Northern Army Group, consisting of four national corps from the UK, Germany, Holland and 
Belgium. The Commander of Northern Army Group or (NORTHAG) held responsibility for the 
northern half of Germany, while his American partner, the US Commander of Central Army 
Group, superintended the defence of Germany south of Kassel. The possibility of a surprise 
attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces, together with BAOR's situation within 
the divided state of Germany, meant that great importance was attached to intelligence, warning 
and rapid mobilisation. Despite the considerable attention that historians have given to Cold War 
espionage, we know surprisingly little about the intelligence dimension of BAOR and its 
interface with Allied intelligence through NORTHAG and NATO. How was intelligence 
configured to support these multinational NATO commands, which had only a limited peacetime 
existence? How would they have faired under the exigencies of surprise attack? This article 
attempts to address these neglected issues for the period for which recent archives are available, 
ending with the impact of the Yom Kippur War upon NATO thinking about warning and 
surprise in the period 1973-5.1
 It is often asserted that during the Cold War the entity referred to as 'NATO intelligence' 
did not really exist, at least as a collection agency. In reality, NATO organisations were largely 
fed with intelligence by the various national components, some of whom kept the alliance on a 
rather meagre diet of low-grade material. In wartime, these restrictions on intelligence supplied 
to NATO would have been removed and the situation would have moved rapidly from famine to 
feast.  This was certainly true at the level of the main NATO political headquarters based in Paris 
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and then, after 1967, at Evere on the outskirts of Brussels. Improbably, the Allied contingency 
plans for war involved sending a deluge of additional and unfamiliar intelligence material to 
NATO amid the panic caused by an impending Warsaw Pact attack. Moreover, the structure of 
intelligence support for NATO at its higher levels was always rather awkward. This constituted a 
source of growing anxiety for planners as NATO nuclear decision-making grew in importance 
during the 1960s.2  
 This article argues that references to 'NATO intelligence' are more plausible when we 
talk about its military structures and especially its regional military commands. This included 
SHAPE Headquarters at Mons, AFCENT Headquarters at Boerfink and notably the operational 
level of Army Groups - typified by NORTHAG Headquarters at Reindahlen.3 Unlike NATO's 
political centre, the various national corps enjoyed considerable intelligence gathering assets of 
their own and were not wholly dependent on the hesitant 'feed' from national elements in the 
rear. Quite how effectively these NATO Army Group HQs were integrated and how good 
intelligence distribution would have been with the onset of war remains unclear. These are 
difficult questions for two reasons. First, and most obviously, war never broke out and so we 
have no 'living' example of BAOR or NORTHAG in action.4 Second, the academic study of 
intelligence at the operational command level is often overlooked, not least because of the 
frequent failure to preserve records below the policy level.5 Accordingly, the analysis of this 
'mezzanine floor' within Cold War intelligence presents a difficult, yet fascinating, research 
problem.6
Throughout the Cold War, NORTHAG's main mission was to engage any Warsaw Pact 
incursion into the Federal Republic with the aim of halting this as far to the East as possible, 
reducing the enemy capacity to such an extent that the attack could not be resumed without 
escalation.7 To achieve this, NORTHAG boasted four army corps: 1 Netherlands Corps (I (NE) 
Corps), 1 German Corps (I (GE) Corps), 1 British  (I (BR) Corps) Corps, and 1 Belgian Corps (I 
(BE) Corps).8 Because the Commander of the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR) also served as 
COMNORTHAG, some of the key HQ functions of NORTHAG and BAOR overlapped and 
many officers were "double-hatted". The British staff officer who served as Brigadier General 
Staff Intelligence and Security at BAOR also served as ACOS G-2 at NORTHAG.9 As we shall 
see, this duality was important in the sensitive world of intelligence. 
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 The danger of surprise attack meant that, for all levels of NATO during the Cold War, 
war warning was perhaps the most important intelligence task. Here, intelligence enjoyed 
something of a tripwire function, an attribute that became yet more significant with the growing 
importance of battlefield nuclear weapons during the 1960s. Beyond the war-warning phase, the 
operational intelligence priorities of NORTHAG diverged significantly from the political and 
strategic intelligence that was required by national capitals or by the main NATO HQ in 
Brussels. Operational interest was focused on deep battlefield intelligence that combined 
surveillance of enemy movements with meteorological and topographical information. In 
practice this translated into a need for intelligence over the NORTHAG front and extending 
beyond the forward edge of the battle area to a minimum distance of about 200 km and ideally 
about 500 km. During the first forty-eight hours of war, the most demanding priority would have 
been near real-time intelligence on enemy movements in this zone.  This was essential to allow 
NORTHAG to concentrate its resources against enemy thrusts, rather than dispersing its forces 
thinly and evenly along the Inner German Border. This was also to provide current target 
intelligence for the tasking of artillery and air operations to slow the enemy down during the 
crucial early stages of an attack. Anxiety about a guaranteed flow of this sort of intelligence 
reflected concern that NORTHAG was under-resourced for its task, a problem that was only 
resolved by the loan of two American brigades in the 1970s.10  
 NORTHAG's intelligence concerns were rendered more complex by the structural 
changes that would have been required as a proper multinational NORTHAG Headquarters came 
into being on the eve of war, and then moved to its wartime 'survival' location. From 1954, 
BAOR enjoyed a purpose-built peacetime headquarters west of the Rhine at Rheindahlen near 
Mönchengladbach.  However, on receipt of war warning, the inhabitants would have 'crashed 
out' to a secret survival location, rumoured to be in the vast forests near Aachen, meanwhile 
making use of an additional rear HQ in some crumbling underground caves at Maastricht. The 
problem of maintaining a satisfactory intelligence flow would have been repeated as the 
command used its mobile elements to leap-frog to new locations, in the hope of evading 
detection by the enemy. Confusion would be compounded by a poor communications 
infrastructure and an influx of reserve staff, some of whom would be unfamiliar with procedures. 
Intelligence mechanisms were unlikely to function smoothly or speedily in the first few days of 
war when they were perhaps most vital, resulting in slow target acquisition. These concerns 
Strategy and Counter-Surprise                                                 
 
 
 5
intensified during the 1960s because NORTHAG intelligence was increasingly conscious of the 
ability of Warsaw Pact forces to operate equally well by night as well as day and perhaps under a 
blanket of near radio-silence. In the period up to 1973, NATO commanders repeatedly identified 
a need for effective deep reconnaissance at night and in bad visibility, but these requirements 
were only met in the late 1970s and 1980s through the advent of sophisticated new technologies. 
 NORTHAG's wartime intelligence priorities were also shaped by political considerations. 
West German sensitivities over the surrender of territory during a Warsaw Pact offensive 
required NORTHAG to plan for a forward battle, with perhaps even West German armoured 
counter-thrusts into the east. In turn, this meant the forward positioning of forces, which could 
only be achieved with ample warning. Local German political considerations were also 
intimately tied to what one author has called 'NATO's nuclear dilemmas'.11 West Germany was 
not keen to see the use of nuclear weapons, even of a tactical sort, on its own soil, and yet 
holding Warsaw Pact forces on the border seemed almost impossible without their early release. 
As early as 1951, the UK Chiefs of Staff had identified tactical nuclear weapons as an attractive 
way of 'compensating for our numerical inferiority vis a vis the Russians' and an effective way 
for dealing with 'Russian mass tactics' in the opening stages of an offensive.  Senior UK 
commanders routinely assumed that they would be employed by both sides in any European 
ground war.12 This sort of thinking placed a high premium on intelligence quickly locating the 
main enemy thrusts as targets for conventional artillery, and then perhaps as targets for tactical 
nuclear weapons, as well as seeking to blunt any similar Soviet tactical nuclear capability. It also 
raised the controversial question of 'demolitions' that were scheduled to be implemented by a 
shadowy mixture civilian and military of stay-behind parties at bridges and other key points. 
These demolitions were initially conventional and consisted of lorry-loads of high explosive, but 
by the 1960s demolitions were increasingly to be achieved by 'special atomic demolition 
munitions' or SADMs. Accordingly, the preparations for the intense first hours of war that were 
developed by NORTHAG planners were highly secret and connected to both intelligence and 
special operations.  
 These difficult issues first reared their head in the mid-1950s and manifested themselves 
as requirements for stronger intelligence and communications systems at every NATO level. 
Thereafter, as policy-makers engaged with flexible response in the late 1960s, the outcome was a 
doctrine of risk manipulation that deliberately mixed conventional forces and theatre nuclear 
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forces surprisingly far forward, making inadvertent escalation probable once war commenced.13 
As a result, an improved communications became paramount not only to distribute intelligence, 
but also assumed 'a particular importance in the light of the need for nuclear release request 
messages'.14 In short, during the late 1960s, commanders were grappling with an inadequate 
physical infrastructure of command, communications and intelligence for NORTHAG - and 
indeed throughout NATO - which was some ten years behind the burdens that these new 
doctrines imposed. A related, but often unspoken high intelligence priority for NORTHAG was 
'the acquisition of targets of the enemy's nuclear delivery means, even if the battle is at that time 
being fought conventionally'. Signals intelligence or 'sigint' was thought to be especially 
important for any attempt to locate Soviet nuclear capable elements.15   
 Alerts and associated matters of transition to war were always controversial within 
NATO. SACEUR enjoyed two different alert systems at this time, the first was the Formal Alert 
System designed for a period of gradually escalating tension that permitted full political 
consultation. The second was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) Counter-
Surprise Military Systems, inaugurated in March 1959, which was designed for an 'acute 
emergency' and allowed him to take measures to ensure the survivability of his forces if 
confronted with a sudden attack.16 This second system connected warning and alert systems to 
states of readiness, mobilisation of reserves and practical measures such as aircraft dispersal. 
War warning also raised complicated matters of access to national intelligence and national 
control over strategic intelligence assets on the brink of war. In the early 1960s there was an 
ongoing debate over exactly how SACEUR's Counter-Surprise  Military Systems should work 
given that much of NATO would only receive certain types of strategic intelligence, such as 
high-grade sigint, after war had broken out  and after some crucial decisions had been taken. 
These problems were very much in the minds of commanders at the operational level of 
command, typically NORTHAG.17   
On 14 March 1960, General Alfred Ward, Commander of NORTHAG, wrote to the four 
ministries of defence of his component national corps asking for permission to agree to minimum 
deployments within the framework of SACEUR's new Counter-Surprise Military System. In 
essence he was requesting permission to respond to a SACEUR alert by moving some of his 
formations, which were very dispersed in peacetime, towards their deployment areas. This was 
intended to increase the chance of his forces being properly deployed before meeting the enemy 
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and, at the very least, he hoped to move units to within the respective operational boundaries of 
the four corps under his control. In peacetime, much of the Dutch and Belgian Corps were well 
to the rear and would have struggled to make their deployment areas quickly. Ward was also 
making a more radical request. He proposed that, should intelligence trigger either State Orange 
(warning of an attack within thirty-six hours) or State Scarlet (warning of an attack within an 
hour), then he should be allowed to 'assume his full powers as a NATO commander … and the 
war-time chain of command should come into being'.18  
 Ward's proposal was that under SACEUR's Counter Surprise Military System, his four 
corps would deploy their covering troops, their demolition task units, anti-aircraft units and 
guards for ammunition sites. All other units would crash out to their survival areas close to their 
peacetime locations. The Northern task force would move to staging areas in the forests of the 
Northern Army Group sector while the 1 Netherlands Corps would assemble in the East of 
Holland. Thereafter three Dutch brigade groups would move into Germany, four German brigade 
groups would move to their concentration areas west of the Weser, five British brigade groups 
would move to their Corps sector and it was presumed the Belgian Corps would already have 
reached location near their deployment area. Understandably, in all four countries there was an 
initial reluctance to delegate full operational command before war started, since this possibly 
implied the authority to open fire. However they eventually agreed to the wartime chain of 
command coming into being with the advent of Counter-Surprise procedures. In part, this 
decision reflected American pressure to provide adequate conventional forces to protect the early 
deployment of nuclear counter-attack units.19
 These counter-surprise systems, which seemed rather hypothetical in 1960 and 1961, 
soon became horribly real. Worries over how to distinguish between real and false alerts were 
discussed in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and materialised again in late 1968 
after NATO suffered the reverberations of the Czech crisis. NATO's various headquarters were 
anxious that they had received little warning of the Czech crisis. Then, almost immediately, 
NATO suffered a false alarm regarding what many saw as an impending Soviet invasion of 
Rumania. A low-grade Dutch intelligence report from Warsaw prophesying an invasion of 
Rumania on 22 November 1968 received high-level circulation in NATO, precipitating a degree 
of panic. What subsequently became known as the 'Rumanian Affair' triggered a further review 
of NATO command and control mechanisms, reflecting an anxiety about intelligence, alerts and 
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attendant crisis.20 By the late 1960s, after a decade of alerts, NATO commands had begun to 
recognise and analyse the scale of the problems that confronted them, prompting new technical 
initiatives in the late 1970s. Indeed by the 1980s, substantially improved intelligence, primarily 
as the result of developments in satellites, paved the way for an entirely new NATO doctrine 
entitled 'Follow on Forces'.21  
 
 
Intelligence Structures 
Where did NORTHAG intelligence originate? As we have already seen, the main element was 
provided by BAOR intelligence and commanded by the Brigadier General Staff (Intelligence and 
Security) at Rheindalen. Accordingly, its origins lie with the gradual shift of UK armed forces in 
Germany from its occupation role to a NATO defensive role. Immediately after the war, Britain's 
main intelligence element in the region was the Intelligence Division of the Control Commission 
Germany, one of largest intelligence organisations ever fielded by the UK.22 In parallel, the other 
national elements of Allied Control Commission also developed large intelligence 
infrastructures. In part this reflected a financial ruse, for although these occupational intelligence 
entities quickly shifted their attention towards Cold War issues, they continued to be paid for by 
the Germans under the occupation costs system. Accordingly, for the allies, this was Cold War 
intelligence on the cheap. However, there were two abiding problems associated with this 
approach. First, with the advent of full recognition of the Federal Republic in 1955, the end of 
the golden age of occupation subsidy for intelligence loomed all too quickly.23 Second, with the 
exception of certain specialised fields such as technical and scientific intelligence, the 
Intelligence Division of Britain's Control Commission Germany (ID) was 'not organised for the 
collation or evaluation of military intelligence'. For this reason, as early as 1950, the remnants of 
Intelligence Division of the Control Commission Germany was being wound down and more 
attention was being given to the development of G (Intelligence) Branch of BAOR.24
 Germany was a fabulous place to gather military intelligence on the Warsaw Pact. 
Therefore, unlike the intelligence branches of most of the UK's regional commands, which 
merely served to feed appreciations to senior staff officers, BAOR was a major collector of 
intelligence, making full use of its unique G (Intelligence and Security) Branch. In March 1950, 
Major General Arthur Shortt, the UK's Director of Military Intelligence, offered the opinion that 
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BAOR intelligence 'was the most important Field Agency on the Soviet Army anywhere  ... It's 
work is not, like most other staff branches, related to the number of troops under its command.' 
Much of their time over the last two years had been taken up with interviewing returning German 
POWs. These gradually returning POWs were, he added, 'our best ground source of direct 
intelligence from within the USSR' and also provided an 'essential' means of cross-checking 
other sources. Many believed that by 1950 the flow of returning German POWs from the Soviet 
Union would have been slowing, but in fact there were still some 200,000 to come and the 
importance of the returnees was increasing, with many being ex-officers or specialists. The last 
POWs did not return until 1955. G (Int & Sy) BAOR had also built up a 'very close liaison' with 
the main intelligence element of the US Army further south at Heidelberg, who allowed the 
British to interrogate Soviet deserters in American hands, and indeed vice versa.25  For this 
reason G (Int & Sy) BAOR was given special protected status from the regular staff reductions 
and economies that were imposed by Whitehall in the 1950s.26  
 Between 1950 and 1970, BAOR gradually expanded its collection capabilities with 
specialised elements, including improved military sigint and an aerial reconnaissance capability 
provided by the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF). By the 1960s, BAOR even had its own 
small security service and humint collection service, known respectively as the British Services 
Security Organisation and the British Services Intelligence Organisation. There were also a 
number of dissemination units producing recognition materials and handbooks on Soviet tactics 
for distribution to front line units and junior commanders. However, while these specialist 
collection units were highly valuable and provided NORTHAG with a reservoir of excellent 
information about their Warsaw Pact adversary, they were not the operational core of 
NORTHAG intelligence.27  
 The core was a series of intelligence cells that worked closely with operations and 
planning sections at every level of the NORTHAG structure. During the late 1960s and early 
1970s there were some efforts to undertake operational analysis on how the NORTHAG 
intelligence system would work under wartime pressure. The main problems that were identified 
related to communications and data overload. Predictably, communications above corps level 
(intra-NORTHAG) were bad, partly because of the complex politics of procuring NATO 
communications systems. Intelligence was often filtered at each HQ before being passed on, 
slowing the process down. Typically, an intelligence cell at the divisional level was expected to 
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cope with some 250 messages an hour. However, they lacked a terminal on the command net and 
received much of their feed from G Ops, which in practice meant they would have to sift 
operational material in an attempt to keep track of a fast moving battle. In short, the main 
problem was information overload, greatly compounded by communications bottlenecks, since 
much time was taken up with encypherment.  In common with much of NATO, many 
NORTHAG intelligence elements lacked access to a secure voice system. 
 NORTHAG intelligence officers who ran these cells also complained that they were 
prisoners of outmoded procedure. During exercises, they spent much of their time compiling 
Intsums and Combintsums that were thought to be of limited value to commanders. They were 
especially doubtful that these would be read in the fast-moving context of the first few days of a 
conflict. In wartime, much of the work of the intelligence cells of NORTHAG's four constituent 
corps would have been 'pattern recognition', trying to understand the particular Soviet 
operational structures that were being used at any stage of the battle. Not all G Int officers were 
trained in this sort of intelligence work. Here the operational research teams reviewing 
NORTHAG intelligence identified the need for more analytical training, having found that some 
officers were often seriously hampered by 'preconceived ideas'. After one exercise they noted 
that in this instance the enemy plans remained concealed from the intelligence officer in question 
the end simply because 'information which did not confirm his preconceived ideas he ignored as 
being false'.28   
 
 
Intelligence Collection in Peacetime 
In the early years, NORTHAG commanders complained repeatedly of weak information on their 
adversary. Initially this charge was justified. In January 1952, General John Harding, who 
oversaw the creation of NORTHAG, observed that our 'intelligence cover of Eastern Germany 
and Poland on which we must depend for warning of attack, and information on Russian and 
Satellite forces is poor and deteriorating'. He urged that 'no effort be spared' to improve it. The 
Directorate of Military Intelligence in London readily accepted Harding's critique of intelligence, 
observing that this 'is realised only too well' and while work was afoot to improve matters it was 
expected to take 'some time'.29 However, this comment also reflected NORTHAG's hierarchy of 
priorities. Although they desired intelligence on Warsaw Pact capabilities, and indeed were ever 
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hungry for detail on these subjects, what they desired above all was intelligence on Soviet 
intentions - specifically war warning. Forty-eight hours warning meant a reasonable chance of 
survival, while only a few hours warning spelled almost certain disaster. Throughout this period 
there was a prevailing paranoia that, despite a complex range of warning indicators, the Soviets 
would somehow manage a sneak attack.  
 NORTHAG received only limited intelligence from UK national sources, including 
human intelligence and signals intelligence.  There were also a small number of German, Dutch 
and Belgian officers at Rheindahlen receiving feed from their national sources. Britain's much 
vaunted Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) or MI6 enjoyed several large stations across Germany, 
and a large establishment in Berlin based at the former Olympic stadium.30 However, SIS had 
been a somewhat moribund organisation during the war and failed to modernise itself 
sufficiently during the immediate post-war period. Only with the advent of Dick White as Chief 
of the Service in the late 1950s did serious reform begin, assisted by the luminary Harold 
Shergold. One indicator of this was the lack of officers with university degrees and it was not 
uncommon for diplomats to refer to SIS as 'the failed BAs'.31 More importantly, all allied 
clandestine human operations into the Communist bloc proved difficult with a high rate of 
compromise and agent loss. This was especially true of the Soviet Union, China and Korea. The 
communist countries invested vast sums in internal security procedures of labyrinthine 
complexity, such as internal passports for moving from one locality to another. The sheer terror 
of attracting the attention of the security authorities led to suspicious characters or new arrivals 
being reported by the local population. Although operations into East Germany, mostly from 
Berlin using former Wehrmacht personnel as agents, were relatively successful as first, they 
became progressively more difficult, partly because of the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961.32
 Although SIS began the Cold War with relatively few officers with a university 
background, they did enjoy the services of the brilliant Cambridge-educated officer Kim Philby. 
Groomed for rapid for promotion, we now recognise Philby as one of the most important Soviet 
spies of the Cold War. Immediately after the war he headed the new SIS anti-Soviet section (R5) 
and in the late 1940s headed to Washington to become SIS liaison with the fledgling CIA. By the 
mid-1950s Philby had fallen under suspicion, but the damage inflicted by this long-term agent 
was already enormous.33 Perhaps even more important with regard to Germany was a further 
penetration agent, the SIS officer George Blake. Unbeknown to his superiors, he was influenced 
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from a young age by members of his family who were committed communists. Stationed in 
Seoul, he was taken prisoner by the North Koreans in 1950 and during his confinement he 
volunteered to work for the KGB. After his release, he served as a senior officer in the SIS Berlin 
station where he provided details of perhaps 400 western agents to the Soviets. Blake remained 
active until he was he was exposed by Michael Goleniewksi, a defecting Polish security service 
officer, who came over to the CIA in 1959.34 The equivalent German service, the BND, seems to 
have faired little better. In November 1961, Heinz Felfe, a senior BND officer was arrested after 
it was discovered that he had been a double-agent for the Soviets for many years. Felfe had been 
a senior wartime SS security officer and was first recruited by the British SIS in 1946 and 
operated in Muenster. By the 1950s he was working for the BND and inflicted serious damage 
on their operations in the East. The communists enjoyed detailed knowledge of German 
intelligence structures, staffs and agents.  Accordingly, many agents that had been recruited by 
SIS and the BND were arrested and later executed.35
 What then of signals intelligence or 'sigint'? Although this is a complex subject and hard 
to summarise, Soviet communications security improved markedly after 1948 and thereafter 
Soviet high-grade communications proved difficult to read until further breakthroughs in the 
1970s.  Instead, much Western sigint conducted against the East during the period discussed in 
this article took the form of medium or low-grade systems or even the monitoring of voice 
traffic. Notwithstanding this, sophisticated traffic analysis and direction finding ensured a flow 
of useful product. In theory at least, this material would provide NORTHAG with war warning, 
since any deviation in normal patterns of signals traffic (even signals traffic that could not be 
read) would alert the west to the possibility of attack. Although front line units might adopt radio 
silence, war preparations were presumed to require many activities, such as unusual movements 
of railway stock, which could be tracked through the interception of open communications. 
Sigint also contributed heavily to Western knowledge about the Soviet Order of Battle and in 
particular about the locations and habits of key units. Innumerable personnel from the West spent 
years along the inner German border listening in to the habits of Soviet fighter aircraft as they 
communicated with their ground controllers, or mapping the effectiveness of Soviet air defence 
radar systems.36
 Although the most daring of these sigint operations, the Berlin Tunnel, was compromised 
by George Blake, it remained effective for some time since the KGB did not inform their 
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compatriots for fear of compromising their well-placed agent.37 Moreover, the British, American 
and Germans all operated further sigint operations along the inner German Border, also at RAF 
Gatow in Berlin and after 1957, from Teufelsberg, the highest point in Berlin. This salient 
location was designed to offer line of sight interception of VHF communications. However, the 
biggest problem for the dual-hatted intelligence chief at NORTHAG, who was also BAOR's 
intelligence chief, was access to UK product. The best technical intelligence systems were 
national assets. So tasking was at best indirect and distribution of product was limited to what 
London thought advisable. A local Government Communications Unit (GCU) distributed 
medium grade sigint to the Commander of BAOR and his senior staff officers.38 However, only 
low-grade sigint could be circulated to and from NATO partners through multinational Special 
Handling Detachments (SHDs). Order of Battle material provided to NORTHAG (constructed 
largely from low-grade sigint) was excellent, but access to other material was intermittent. 
Problems of access were evident for subordinate elements such 2ATAF. Although much 
intelligence work in Berlin was undertaken by RAF sigint units in Berlin, often the product was 
not passed to the frontline customers in RAF Germany for security reasons. Even the 
NORTHAG commander was not in receipt of really high-grade sigint during peacetime.39  
 Accordingly, commanders in Germany were always anxious to expand their own 
considerable peacetime collection and analysis resources. An early development was the 
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Bureau, which was perhaps the most important intelligence 
unit within the Intelligence Division of Control Commission Germany. This unit was responsible 
for interrogating returning Germans POWs and civilians who has been in the East. Because the 
Soviets retained German POWs for more than a decade after the end of the war and used them 
extensively on military and industrial projects they provided an invaluable source of intelligence 
on a vast range of Soviet projects, including atomic programmes. The volume of these activities 
was vast and the quality of the product was high. Indeed, during the 1950s, in terms of military 
intelligence that was of direct value to NORTHAG, these activities were probably as valuable as 
the material provided by BND and SIS.40  
 The other major collection asset was the British Commander-in-Chief's Mission to the 
Soviet Forces in Germany (BRIXMIS). This was initiated on 16 September 1946 under the 
Robertson-Malinin Agreement. The agreement called for an exchange of liaison missions, 
(effectively teams of roving military attachés) whose task was to encourage good relations 
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between the two occupation zones. In 1947, parallel agreements for smaller missions were 
concluded by the Soviets, French and American commanders in Germany.  These missions 
remained in being until October 1990.41 Inevitably, the ability of the BRIXMIS missions to drive 
around relatively freely within the GDR was quickly turned to address the task of gathering 
intelligence on Warsaw Pact forces. The BRIXMIS mission had several intelligence tasks. It 
provided the premiere source of technical intelligence on new Soviet equipment, examples of 
which were often 'liberated' and spirited back to the west. Quite often this meant copies of field 
manuals, but even included examples of live artillery shells stolen from training areas. They 
provided invaluable material on Order of Battle and troop movements that could be cross-
checked with sigint. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it provided a reliable source of war 
warning - since BRIXMIS were 'eyes on the ground' - and could not be spoofed by techniques 
such as radio silence. Their missions were subjected to continual hostility from both Soviet 
Forces and the East German Stasi during this period, which even extended to the ramming of 
mission cars by Soviet lorries. BRIXMIS also worked closely with signals intelligence and 
atomic intelligence units, placing specialist monitoring equipment in the East on behalf of 
national agencies. While much has been made of the semi-covert activities of BRIXMIS, its 
greatest value remained direct liaison between the British and Soviet commanders in Germany. 
Although all sides kept the military missions separate from CSCE arrangements, they 
nevertheless provided an important means of defusing tensions and also of directly testing the 
temperature of East-West military relations.42
 One of the greatest BRIXMIS coups was only revealed in 2004 and involved precisely 
this curious mixture of intelligence and liaison activity. On 6 April 1966, a new and highly secret 
Soviet Yak jet fighter crashed into the Havelsee, a large body of water located between the 
Soviet and British control sectors of Berlin. The incident was first detected by British sigint 
specialists from the RAF's 26 Signals Unit based at Gatow airfield, whose task was to listen in to 
fighter ground control stations. Overtly, the task of BRIXMIS was to handle the business of a 
complex salvage operation that would return the aircraft and the remains of the two dead pilots to 
the Soviet authorities. However, beneath the surface of the lake, they were also managing a  
complex technical intelligence operation. The aircraft's radar and engines were removed, quickly 
flown to the UK for inspection, and then returned to wreckage with 48 hours. Meanwhile, 
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BRIXMIS spun out the 'recovery' operation. The prize was access aircraft's revolutionary new 
radar system and the possibility of developing effective counter-measures.43   
 For NORTHAG, the activities of BRIXMIS brought additional value. Their existence 
owed everything to direct agreements between the Commander in Chief of BAOR and his 
opposite number in Soviet Zone and therefore Rheindahlen 'owned' BRIXMIS completely. 
Accordingly, while BRIXMIS often worked with London and UK national agencies, it was very 
much a creature of BAOR and tasked by them. Relations between the BRIXMIS Chief of 
Mission and the BGS Int & Sy at Reindahlen were exceptionally close. This was reinforced by 
the fact that the Mission officers, including its chief, were regular Army officers and not 
specialist Intelligence Corps personnel. They related immediately to the practical intelligence 
needs of NORTHAG. BRIXMIS staff deliberately gave their material the lowest classification 
possible to ensure its wide circulation throughout BAOR and NORTHAG. All these missions 
served not only as an important intelligence gathering system, but also as genuine crisis 
prevention mechanism.44 Additionally, BRIXMIS had managed to escape the financial problems 
imposed on SIS by the advent of the Federal Republic in 1955. BRIXMIS was paid for by the 
Berlin Senat and effectively enjoyed an unlimited budget that allowed it to purchase the very 
latest equipment.45
 Overall, UK national agencies do not seem to have accorded frontline forces in BAOR 
much priority. Whitehall was the preferred customer and whole architecture of the intelligence 
machine was anything but forward-leaning. It is hardly surprising that UK commanders in 
Germany were keen to develop their own resources. With the depletion of the human clandestine 
networks run by BND and SIS during the late 1950s and early 1960s, BRIXMIS became ever 
more important to them. This in turn led to a divergence of view. BRIXMIS paid particular 
attention to Warsaw Pact deployment patterns and were notably pessimistic about the chances of 
detecting the early stages of a surprise attack using technical means such as imagery or sigint. 
Their roving patrols were increasingly conscious of operational break-out drills conducted by 
entire divisions under radio silence. BRIXMIS teams discovered that the GDR had also installed 
elaborate networks of landlines that provided for communications to remote locations that were 
immune to interception. Exactly how much warning of the coming of war NATO would receive 
was a matter of constant debate at all levels of command. The lower the command echelon, the 
more gloomy the prevailing opinion tended to be. 
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Intelligence Collection and Special Forces in War 
Although the British, French and American military missions provided a fabulous source of both 
operational and technical intelligence for NORTHAG, these were peacetime missions. While a 
few SAS personnel serving with BRIXMIS were preparing for stay-behind activities, in reality 
most of BRIXMIS expected to be rounded up perhaps twenty-four hours before any military 
action took place. This in itself might have provided an indicator of impending crisis. However, 
thereafter, with NORTHAG's main eyes and ears inside the GDR gone, what would have been 
the main source of intelligence in the first hours of a hot war in Europe?  At Army Group level 
the primary need was to try to track the movement of the main enemy thrusts, together with 
reinforcements and logistics anything up to 500km behind the front line. Commanders needed to 
discern the Warsaw Pact's emerging battle plan and to disrupt its momentum in a timely way. 
Therefore, the most demanding task was long-range surveillance. Long-range intelligence for 
NORTHAG was expected to be provided by a mixture of air reconnaissance, sigint and above all 
stay-behind parties. 
 Remarkably, during the 1950s and the 1960s NORTHAG commanders seems to have 
placed the greatest emphasis on the least technical of these options, human reconnaissance from 
stay-behind patrols. This was often referred to in local parlance as 'the Mk.1. eyeball'. From the 
onset of war, intelligence inside the Soviet occupied areas would have been provided by 
dedicated stay-behind parties from NATO special forces. Prevailing doctrine suggested that these 
special forces had several deep penetration roles in wartime: 
 
(a) Collection of intelligence by active or passive methods 
(b) Offensive operations by small parties 
(c) Co-operation with partisans or guerrillas 
(d) Assistance to combat survivors, and other operations connected with evaders 
      and escapers [downed pilots] 
 
However, in the context of global war, intelligence collection was deemed to be the predominant 
task of SAS-type units. It was also emphasised that they should give particular reference to 
enemy atomic systems and the only coup-de-main type activities that were considered important 
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were likewise attendant efforts to 'destroy enemy nuclear weapons or missile sites'.46  This 
reflected a growing recognition that Warsaw Pact forces might move too fast to allow air 
reconnaissance to provide effective targeting intelligence for NATO artillery. It was also 
recognised that NATO commanders would press for early release of nuclear weapons for fear 
that Warsaw Pact units would deliberately 'hug' their opponents, making the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons increasingly difficult as the battle developed.47   
 By 1962, NORTHAG was busy developing a new force for this important role. This 
involved adding a Special Reconnaissance Squadron (SRS) from the Royal Armoured Corps to 
strengthen 23 SAS. During the initial alert, SRS were expected to hold the fort until the arrival of 
23 SAS who would be flow in from UK.48 Thereafter 23 SAS and SRS were to operate as a 
single unit giving priority to sightings of 'nuclear units, formation HQs, armour, and bridging and 
ferrying equipment.' Their main task was to provide the target intelligence for the Honest John 
missile systems and heavy artillery.49 These special units were based at Padeborn and were 
equipped with HF morse to provide long range and, hopefully, continued communications even 
in an EMP environment. Because the expected rapid rate of advance by Warsaw Pact force there 
was no need for these units to practice exotic skills to penetrate the enemy front line. Instead the 
drill was to move forward quickly, usually by any available soft transport such as a 3-ton truck. 
Special forces would eventually meet the units tasked as the rearguard or delaying force and as 
these elements withdrew, the special forces would stay behind. Preparations for this activity had 
become quite elaborate by the late 1960s with pre-identified hides and some pre-positioned SAS 
stocks buried underground. Much of this activity was focused on what commanders referred to 
as the 'demolition belt'. These were zones some way east of the Rhine where it was hoped that 
bottlenecks would occur amongst aggressor forces some twenty-four hours after the Warsaw 
Pact forces had attacked. 
 All the component national corps of NORTHAG recognised the value of stay-behind 
operations. The Germans created the “Fallshirmjäger Fernspähkompanie” while the Belgians 
boasted two companies of para-commandos dedicated to this role. To the south, each American 
Corps developed its own ranger-type companies dedicated to Long Range Reconnaissance 
Patrols. Eventually NATO set up its own International Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol 
School run by German officers at Weingarten in Bavaria.50  It is widely accepted that some of 
the American special forces units were equipped with Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs) in 
Strategy and Counter-Surprise                                                 
 
 
 18
an attempt to slow the advance of Soviet armour.51 Although ADMs posed serious problems of 
contamination because they would have generated a great deal of fallout, they were nevertheless 
popular with military planners since they were considered to be more defensive and less 
escalatory than other types of tactical nuclear weapons.52  
Although kept highly confidential, the use of demolitions by joint teams of engineers, 
sappers and special forces, had long been part of Western plans to slow an advancing enemy in 
the first few hours of war. In the 1950s the emphasis was on conventional demolitions. As early 
as July 1950, General Lawton Collins, the US Army Chief of Staff wrote to his British 
counterpart, William Slim explaining that he was 'thoroughly convinced of the great value of 
carrying out these strategic demolitions' and urging the allocation of more engineer teams to the 
task.53 In 1952, UK commanders in Germany were also arguing for 'the most extensive use of 
demolitions' in war planning for Europe.54 All these commanders gave importance to co-
ordinating demolition activities across Germany - and indeed even into Austria. In April 1952, 
the UK Chiefs of Staff had initiated discussions with the Austrian Chancellor on the matter and 
had agreed to send an 'M.I.6. technical adviser to advise the Austrian authorities on strategic 
demolitions there in the event of war'.55 Indeed, by this point there was clearly a co-ordinated 
allied plan for a chain of demolitions extending on through southern Europe, the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East, where the CIA seem to have had the majority of the responsibility for oil 
denial.56
 By the early 1960s there was growing emphasis was upon atomic demolitions. During 
1963, NORTHAG were planning to deploy two types of ADMs, one with a yield of 2 kt and one 
with a yield of 10 kt, the latter primarily with a view to bridge demolition.57 From the mid-1960s 
specialist ADM sappers from the UK were attending training courses at Fort Belvoir in the 
United States and appear to have been the only European country offered this facility.  UK 
planning scales suggested that BAOR would eventually have 25 ADM specialists available at 
one time.58 However, throughout the 1960s NORTHAG remained dependent on American ADM 
teams lent by EUCOM at Heidelberg. In September 1965, it was reported that 'all ADM's in 
Germany are American devices which are allocated to SACEUR to Northern Army Group and 
are emplaced and fired by US personnel'. This reflected a 1962 decision, taken by the British 
Prime Minster, Harold Macmillan, not to procure a separate UK stock of these weapons on cost 
grounds.59 However, by 1965 there was clearly a growing UK interest in developing their own 
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devices.60 This reflected anxiety in NORTHAG about delays in deployment due to the 
possibility of complex political restrictions, custodial arrangements and arguments over available 
numbers of weapons. By 1967, UK Army Engineers were in discussion with the UK Atomic 
Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston about a weapon that could be 'carried man-
pack in sections by a few soldiers' of which two or three hundred were expected to be acquired.61  
ADMs were a sensitive area where intelligence, strategy and alert measures came 
together. The specific role of the Commander of NORTHAG was to review ADM targets 
submitted by the various Corps for inclusion in a regional priority programme, to allocate 
nuclear weapons to Corps, to maintain a reserve, to delegate authority for firing once received 
from SACEUR and to allocate the available ADM teams. During peacetime the US teams were 
located in the CENTAG area and would have move into NORTHAG under SACEUR alert 
measures. However, NORTHAG were increasingly anxious about the fact that they could only 
detonate once direct US approval had been received.62  In 1967, with the advent of flexible 
response, ADMs acquired a yet higher profile.63 Accordingly, by 1971 the UK appears to have 
been moving ahead with its own ADM programme with a primary focus on NORTHAG 
requirements. This was designated 'Project Clipeus'.64  
 Whether conventional or nuclear, a substantial part of the demolition effort by 
NORTHAG's special forces and sappers would have been water-born. In the late 1940s, BAOR 
had operated a Royal Marine Demolition Unit manned by former members of the Special Boat 
Service based at HMS Royal Prince at Krefeld on the German-Dutch border. They were 
equipped with fast and efficient German Torpedo-Recovery boats and rescue craft. In 1949 this 
had been renamed the Royal Navy Rhine Flotilla - a veritable inland navy - which was upgraded 
in 1950 to a peacetime strength of some thirty craft.65 At the same time, the personnel from the 
Royal Marines Demolition Unit, many of whom were trained frogmen, were re-organised to 
form 2 and 3 Special Boat Service squadrons who were given designated demolition and stay-
behind roles on the Rhine. In war they would have been joined by 4 and 5 Special Boat Service 
squadrons which were territorial units. This flotilla co-operated with US Navy's Rhine River 
Patrol at Karslruhe and the French Forces Maritimes du Rhin based at Koblenz. A key role for 
these units was using demolition munitions to destroy bridges over rivers, not only on the Rhine 
but also the Weser and Elbe.66  They were also tasked to sow the more attractive crossing points 
with thousands of mines and to destroy craft that might assist the enemy with river crossings. 
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The commander of RN Rhine Flotilla noted that demolition was 'really the main and most 
difficult problem'. As well as attacking various bridges, they were required to sink or severely 
damage some 1500 to 2000 vessels in 'an incredibly short space of time'. This was thought to be 
between three to five days. Whatever had not been done by then would have to be finished off by 
the Special Boat Service 'in territory occupied by the enemy'.67 As early as 1950, a requirement 
for some 18,000 limpet mines for the Allied Rhine Flotillas and associated commando units had 
been raised.68  
 The dependence upon a few soldiers for the targetting of nuclear artillery and key 
battlefield missile systems such as Corporal and Honest John was an obvious weakness in 
NORTHAG plans for the first few hours of war. During the late 1960s and early 1970s 
NORTHAG became increasingly concerned about the potential vulnerability of stay-behind 
parties and began to carry out research on their capability and survivability. An extensive 
programme of research was carried out during the 23 SAS annual training exercise held in 
Germany during October 1973, codenamed 'Badger's Lair'. Eight SAS teams were deployed on 
the Soltau training area. BAOR signals teams conducted elaborate tests to investigate their 
vulnerability to intercept and Direction Finding (DF) procedures. RAF units examined 
concealment procedures by over-flying the SAS hide locations with thermal cameras, infra-red 
systems as well as monochrome photography. Vulnerability to searches with dog patrols were 
also examined. To the dismay of the SAS, during these tests some 39 hides were created but 37 
were found within the first six hours by the patrols and dogs were 'highly successful' throughout 
the trials. Even more remarkable was success with electronic warfare sensor vehicles. To the 
surprise of the research teams, these intercepted not only hand-speed morse but also, burst-
encrypted traffic. DF bearings were achieved at ranges of up to 12 kilometres and accurate 
bearings using triangulation between three vehicles were achieved at ranges of 5 kilometres. By 
contrast, airborne systems whether deployed by aircraft or helicopter revealed almost nothing. 
These tests prompted a decision to try to develop better communications equipment for stay-
behind parties, which were now recognised as highly vulnerable.69  
 Partly because of the problem of moving special forces forward at short notice and 
getting demolitions into place in time, further undercover plans had been formulated by 
commanders. From the outset NORTHAG had also counted on an additional secret force of 
civilians who would conduct a mixture of intelligence reporting, sabotage and demolition work. 
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One of the originators of this activity appears to be General John Harding, who oversaw the 
emergence of NORTHAG in the early 1950s. He observed: 
 
Our chances of imposing effective delay on the enemy's advance east of the 
Rhine will depend largely on the success of our demolition plans. All 
practicable preparations must be made beforehand to make the plan effective, 
including the organisation of a German manned stay behind sabotage 
organisation. A great deal still requires to be done in these respects. 
 
Harding saw this civilian organisation carrying out demolitions in order to give his defensive 
forces time to get into position in the opening few hours of the campaign during which the 'time 
margin will be very narrow'. Thereafter he saw them as attacking targets such as enemy fuel 
supplies. He repeatedly emphasised that to 'pay the highest possible dividend such an 
organisation should be German manned'.70 By the end of the 1950s such an organisation had 
come into being. Often referred to by its code-name 'Gladio' it was controlled by the Allied 
Clandestine Committee at SHAPE and was active throughout the Cold War.71   
NORTHAG's heavy dependence on SAS-type activities also raises interesting questions 
about sigint, which had been a key source of real-time operational intelligence during the Second 
World War and had continued to be so in various low intensity conflicts such as Aden and 
Borneo. NORTHAG certainly enjoyed its own significant sigint and electronic warfare capability 
which was presided over by the NORTHAG Intercept Control Centre (ICC). In time of war it 
would have also received additional national sigint from airborne collection. This included 
specialist Canberra and Comet aircraft from 51 Squadron, albeit their main role would have been 
to support the UK airborne deterrent. Fortunately, ICC also enjoyed its own sigint and electronic 
warfare resources in the form of units such as the UK's 225 Signals Squadron which was tasked 
to support BAOR. At Corps level there were also Electronic Warfare Control Centres that 
worked as subordinate units to ICC. The tasks of these tactical sigint centres included direction 
finding or position fixing against enemy HQs and radio jamming. These units had proved an 
invaluable intelligence contribution to NORTHAG in peacetime through their work on the Soviet 
Order of Battle. Over years particular operators learned the signature of Soviet bloc forces 
allowing them to learn a great deal about each distinct formation. However, these tactical sigint 
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units themselves felt that this very success in peacetime had perhaps led to a dangerous over-
estimation of their likely contribution in wartime. They observed: 
 
In a war of limited duration in NW Europe, if the standard of security in WP 
[Warsaw Pact] communication links is good, the timely intelligence and useful 
steerage that 225 can provide will be very small … The problem … is not so 
much one of equipment quantities but rather the difficulty of conducting EW in 
a highly mobile tactical environment … The wartime limitations of 225 Signal 
Squadron are not widely known as a result the squadron's capabilities are 
overrated. 
 
This was worrying because electronic warfare was one of the few planned intelligence sources 
for determining the location of enemy headquarters. Sigint specialists feared that the Soviets 
might be routinely 'remoting' the radios associated with their major headquarters at distance of 2 
km in which the effectiveness of NORTHAG's direction finding efforts would be 'drastically 
reduced'. Their only hope was that under the stress of war, Warsaw Pact communications 
security might lapse, but this was by no means certain. Indeed, some predicted that for the first 
twenty-four hours the Warsaw Pact might advance on pre-designated lines and keep near-radio 
silence. 
 NORTHAG's senior offices clearly had high hopes that their tactical EW/Sigint 
organisation would provide a continual flow of information on enemy deployment patterns as 
well as intentions in the first few hours of war. They also desired information on the 'location of 
enemy headquarters and missile launching sites'. However, in reality only FROG missile 
launching sites were likely to within range, while the more important SCUD missile sites would 
have been outside the typical operating range of tactical sigint, which was widely thought to be 
only 40-50km. NORTHAG was intrigued by the American decision to introduce airborne tactical 
sigint systems, but were sceptical about its ability to perform given that they would have to fly 
well back from the battle area in order to survive, perhaps picking up mostly allied transmission 
and background noise.72 In fact, these sorts of systems - known as 'Guardrail' - were introduced 
in the 1970s by the US Army in CENTAG and proved highly effective.73 It is likely that the 
arrival of these valuable operational sigint collectors for the US Army reflected good previous 
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experiences during the 1960s with the U-2 aircraft which had undertaken regular perimeter sigint 
flights around the Eastern Bloc.74
 The biggest limitation on NORTHAG's own local ground-based sigint capability was 
range of intercept. The primary mode of Warsaw Pact command and control was VHF radio and 
the range over which this could be intercepted was 40-50 kilometres. This reflected both 
transmitter power and also the need for line of sight interception. Accordingly, it was possible to 
meet Divisional Comint requirements, but problems would have occurred at the level of Corps 
and above who needed to see further behind the front line. Accordingly, intelligence would only 
be gained from ground based VHF intercept on Warsaw Pact reserve divisions when it was too 
late for the Corps HQs, or Northag HQ to react. Limitations of range also required sigint 
collectors to be based as far forward as possible, exposing them to risk and forcing them to move 
frequently, which was not 'conducive to the best COMINT collection'.75 Pessimism was 
reinforced by the knowledge that at the level of Divisional HQ and above Soviet communication 
security was good. In 1969, UK officials conceded that while monitoring recent large scale 
exercises they had found that the Soviet ability to 'successfully use communications security 
measures results in lean intelligence collected by the SIGINT organisation'.76  
 During the late 1960s, American and French units to the south acquired effective ground 
surveillance radar systems, however equivalent radar equipment did not enter service in the 
NORTHAG sector until the 1970s. NORTHAG were also impressed by the US Army's Mohawk 
OV-1B aircraft equipped with Sideways-Looking Airborne Radar which offered a night-time  
and near all-weather capability. These aircraft had demonstrated remarkably good performance 
in Vietnam and had provided the main source of intelligence on night movement by enemy 
vehicles. It could detect lorries at ranges of up to 70km and NORTHAG hoped that the 
Luftwaffe units in 2ATAF might decide to acquire it. Although demonstrator aircraft flew in 
both German and French colours this useful aircraft was never acquired by European forces.77 
Only during the mid-1970s did new technology begin to provide alternative sources for 
NORTHAG. Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), initially trialled in Vietnam as the 'Igloo White' 
programme began to become available in Europe. By the early 1980s, UGS had become a 
formidable intelligence instrument for NORTHAG. Many of the early models - nicknamed 
'bump-counters' - were tested during real Warsaw Pact exercises in the east, having been put in 
position by BRIXMIS personnel.78
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 Had war broken out prior to 1970, NORTHAG would have turned to traditional air 
reconnaissance with cameras by 2ATAF for longer-range intelligence.79 However, both 2ATAF 
and also 4ATAF (who supported CENTAG) had limited reconnaissance resources in Germany. 
Moreover this source of intelligence would have diminished quickly because an aircraft casualty 
rate of some 60% was expected over the first 7 days of any engagement with the Soviets. 
Attrition rates were much debated by senior commanders with some pessimists suggesting a 
'Pearl Harbor' type scenario in which a high proportion of NATO airfields might be eliminated in 
series of early and successful pre-emptive strikes which 'could result in few aircraft surviving to 
carry out reconnaissance'. Most observers agreed that once battle commenced, aircraft 
vulnerability would require low flying which in turn would limit the area that could be surveyed 
by airborne sensors. Effectiveness was also hampered by a tendency to retain aircraft under 
centralised control, which meant that requests for reconnaissance had to travel through several 
commands before being met. By 1969 this problem was being addressed with plans to allocate 
some reconnaissance aircraft directly to individual Corps within in NORTHAG and to give more 
helicopters to armoured reconnaissance units.80   
 Finally, in previous wars, both captured enemy documents and POW interrogation had 
proved to be a valuable source of intelligence and those interested in learning the lessons of the 
past were determined to put an elaborate NATO systems in place to address this.81 During 1954 
considerable attention was given to the creation of a NATO Captured Enemy Documents 
Organisation (CEDO) which advised Standing Group and was intended to partner a POW 
Interrogation Organisation and also a NATO Technical Intelligence Agency (SGTIA). The 
intention was that at the operation level, NATO would field a number of Regional Document 
Units at Army Group level.82 However, by the 1960s commanders were increasingly convinced 
that few Soviet prisoners or documents would be taken during a rapid Warsaw Pact advance and 
in any case the fluid situation would render any intelligence gained from interrogation all but 
useless. Accordingly, while NATO procedures for POW interrogation were standardized, the 
emphasis was increasingly on local exploitation of prisoners by tactical units.83
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Conclusions 
During the 1950s, the North German plains seemed like the Cold War's frozen front with little 
likelihood of real conflict. However, by the early 1960s a number of crises had created a climate 
of growing anxiety. Confrontations over Berlin and Cuba, together with an escalating war in 
Vietnam made war seem somewhat closer. The Six Day War in 1967 and the Czech coup in 
1968 were also unsettling for commanders. Moreover, throughout the 1960s there was growing 
awareness that NATO's conventional inferiority in numbers, especially in the NORTHAG 
region, might call for the early use of nuclear weapons to stem the tide of a Warsaw Pact attack. 
All this generated considerable strain, not only on the systems that supplied intelligence for 
warning, but also on the command and communications network that supported SACEUR's 
Counter-Surprise System and would have brought NATO's multi-national commands such as 
NORTHAG to life.  
 With this in mind, in May 1968, London and Washington began considering up-grading 
the flow of signals intelligence to the new NATO political headquarters that had just moved from 
Paris to the outskirts of Brussels. Bill Millward, Director of Requirements at GCHQ, had already 
been out to Brussels for talks with the UK Military Representative on this subject.  However, 
these plans were plagued by repeated espionage flaps. In the autumn of 1968 a Turkish Colonel, 
Nahit Imre, NATO's financial controller was revealed to be an agent working for the Rumanian 
intelligence service.84  In London, the Imre case caused real consternation. Ronnie Burroughs in 
the Foreign Office immediately saw the connection between this case and the recent decision to 
improve sigint for NATO. He wrote to Senior UK representative on the North Atlantic Council 
asking 'whether we are right to proceed with our plans to set up an all-NATO GCHQ cell at 
Evere'?85  London eventually decided to press ahead with developments, but was clearly 
unsettled.86
 During 1969 NATO was shaken again by the unravelling of the Roussilhe Case. Francis 
Roussilhe was a French employee of the International Staff who had worked for NATO since 
1952 and had gradually risen to be Chief Clerk of the Document Translation Centre. Since 1963 
he had provided the Rumanian intelligence service with at least 5,000 NATO documents 
including Cosmic Top Secret material. As with Imre, he was caught as the result of information 
from a high-level Rumanian defector secured by the Americans.87  The UK Chiefs of Staff now 
took a 'very grave view' of developments and were anxious to make sure that issues arising from 
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it were not  'swept under the carpet'. There were many voices in London who now argued that the 
UK was putting its own forces at risk 'by passing too much information to NATO'.88  
 Notwithstanding all this, the development of a GCHQ cell for NATO at Evere still went 
ahead. One may well ask why, given the repeated security breaches in the late 1960s? The 
answer probably lay in the modest nature of the proposal for improved sigint that had emerged 
from the Working Group set up by NATO's Special Committee. This was narrowly focused on 
intelligence that might influence 'a timely decision to release nuclear weapons'. It was 
specifically about intelligence during the critical period between consultation on a developing 
security situation and request for the release or use of nuclear weapons. In other words, there was 
never any intention to supply NATO's political machine with sigint on a regular basis under 
normal peacetime conditions. Instead it only sought to regularise the position that had occurred 
during  Middle East War of 1967. During this earlier crisis, the UK and the USA had provided 
NATO with most of its intelligence, based largely on sigint, requiring the laborious production of 
'specially tailored' documents that provided detail on the situation without compromising 
sources.89  
No less important during the late 1960s was the recognition of the need for higher-grade 
command and communications links between NATO and its constituent commands.90  The 
ability of SHAPE, AFCENT, NORTHAG and their constituent Corps to communicate was 
notoriously weak and had little redundancy. Accordingly, in 1970, NATO began a serious effort 
to address its communications problems. Member states signed up to a large-scale programme to 
provide a modern communications system entitled the NATO Integrated Communications 
System (NICS). Alongside this they initiated a NICS Management Agency, NICSMA, with the 
task of planning and implementing the system. The long-term objective was to afford rapid, 
secure and survivable communications to NATO's senior political and military echelons.91
 If NATO intelligence officers were unsettled by international events at the end of the 
1960s then worse was to come. By October 1973 they found themselves operating under the 
shadow of the Yom Kippur War which delivered many unpleasant surprises. Although regular 
exercises were a feature of military life in Europe, most component elements of NATO had not 
been involved in a major war since Korea. Accordingly, all eyes were on Yom Kippur to see 
what could be learned. The surprise attack that the Arabs inflicted upon Israel in October 1973 
only served to provoke new levels of anxiety in NATO about intelligence, warning and 
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communications. This Middle East episode witnessed excellent Arab deception, poor Israeli 
intelligence analysis combined with anxiety and indecisiveness about whether to mobilise or not. 
It also provided evidence of good Arab signals intelligence and weak Israeli communications 
security. In Europe, observers were not slow to realise that the same underlying problems would 
be faced by NATO in Germany, compounded by the need for complex inter-Allied consultation 
on the eve of war. Commanders noted: 
 
NATO is confident of and requires 48 hours warning of an attack in Europe 
because of the scale of preparations necessary for even a limited attack. 
However, in a situation similar to the Central front, the Israeli's vaunted 
intelligence system noted all the indicators and failed to construe them 
correctly. NATO might do no better, and a close and careful reappraisal of our 
intelligence collection methods and analysis procedures is indicated. 
 
There was an increasing appreciation that, for the Warsaw Pact, their large standing forces made 
'surprise attack an attractive option'. What would happen if the Soviets traded the cost of limited 
preparations and reserve mobilisation for the advantage of complete surprise? It was conceded 
that although the NATO procedure worked reasonably well during exercises based on adequate 
warning time, 'it has yet to be exercised against a surprise attack'.92
 Off-setting some of these anxieties, the early 1970s saw improving East-West relations. 
The Soviets had become embroiled in border clashes with the Chinese and, together with Nixon's 
decision to play the 'China card', this had prompted Moscow to seek Détente with the West. An 
agreement that defused tensions over Berlin was signed in March 1970. More important was the 
treaty signed between East and West Germany in December 1972 which allowed both to 
members of United Nations.93 All this was accompanied by arms control agreements and 
confidence building measures that were underpinned by verification. Improved satellite systems 
supported these agreements and also went some way to addressing anxieties about warning and 
surprise. Arguably, the emergence of CSCE, with its emphasis on the avoidance of crisis and 
surprise, also reflected a growing recognition that the command and control systems on both 
sides were fundamentally ill-suited to rapid decision making under pressure.  
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 Despite the centrality of this subject, our knowledge remains incomplete and many 
questions remain to be answered. Did intelligence help to stabilise the situation in Western 
Europe, or was it a potential source of provocation? One the one hand, we might argue that both 
NATO intelligence on the East - and also Warsaw Pact intelligence regarding NATO - 
contributed to some improvement in relations. Complex warning indicators at least gave each 
side the hope of 48 hours notice of attack. Some Eastern bloc espionage against NATO 
headquarters also had the effect of calming nerves. During the 1960s, East German penetration 
of the NATO registries was so complete that the Warsaw Pact seems to have been largely 
convinced that the intentions of West European countries were genuinely defensive and 
benign.94 Yet these assessments were offered as probabilities, rather than certainties, since no 
amount of intelligence ever provided complete confirmation. Meanwhile, somewhat perversely, 
the onset of Détente and Ostpolitik, with its flurry of new embassies and consulates, presented 
fresh opportunities to accelerate the intelligence war. Intelligence assessments may have been 
reassuring, but intelligence collection operations themselves could be destabilising. Ironically, it 
was an espionage case that trigged the resignation of Chancellor Willy Brandt, the author of 
Ostpolitik. Accordingly, there was no let up for the intelligence agencies supporting NATO in 
Northwest Europe and they remained busy for another two decades until the end of the Cold 
War.95
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